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Abstract 
This study finds that the process of evolutionary development of the Kiryu weaving 
district in Japan from 1895 to 1930 can be divided into the two phases, i.e., Smithian 
growth based on the inter-firm division of labor using hand looms and Schumpeterian 
development  based  on  factory  system  using  power  looms.  Weaving 
manufacturers-cum-contractors led Smithian growth by organizing sub-contracts with 
out-weavers in rural villages among others, thereby contributing to the steady growth in 
production.    Newly emerged joint stock firms played a role of genuine entrepreneurs 
by  realizing  significant  scale  economies  and  transforming  the  traditional  weaving 
district into a cluster of large modern factories. 
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Pioneering  studies  on  industrial  districts  or  clusters  in  business  and  economic 
history by Piore and Sabel (1984) and Sabel and Zeitlin (1997) have contributed to clear 
understanding  of  their  important  roles  in  the  development  of  national  economy  in 
Western countries.    The investigation of industrial districts per se was not new; their 
studies were new because they tried to explain major advantages of industrial districts 
by  using  the  concept  of  ‘externalities’  which Alfred  Marshal  introduced  almost  one 
century ago (Marshall 1920).    In fact, by analyzing industrial districts through the lens 
of such externalities, the nature of competition and source of competitive advantage 
have been more clearly identified (Porter 1998).
  
By  reviewing  the  burgeoning  literature  on  industrial  districts  or  clusters  in 
many  countries,  regions,  and  industries,  Zeitlin  (2008)  concludes  his  article  by 
highlighting three major remaining research questions; (1) the relationship between the 
district  and  the  wider  world,  (2)  the  changing  morphology  of  the  districts  and 
relationships among different sizes and types of firms within them, and (3) governance 
and coordination mechanisms within the districts.    In the case of Japan, recent studies 
on industrial districts focus mainly on the last  point (Abe 1992, 1999; Fujita 1998; 





institutions  and  organizations  within  the  district  played  an  important  role  in  the 
introduction and diffusion of new technologies, as they entailed technology spillovers 
among firms and created the problem of inferior quality products, which damaged the 
reputation of the district (Sawai 1999; Hashino forthcoming).
1 
In  contemporary  developing  world,  cluster-based  industrial  development  is 
widely observed.    Sonobe and Otsuka (2006, 2011) primarily analyze the determinants 
of the quality improvement of products and the possibility of exports from the clusters 
in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, which correspond to the first problem identified by 
Zeitlin.    Nadvi (1999) and Shumitz (1995) discuss the governance and coordination 
mechanism  of  the  cluster,  which  lead  to  what  they  call  collective  efficiency  in  the 
context of South Asia and  Latin America.    Their studies squarely address the third 
issue of Zeitlin.    While the importance of industrial clusters for economic development 
has been well analyzed by them, the historical or long-term perspectives are limited in 
their studies. 
The aim of this study is to explore how and why the different sizes and types of 
firms within the district appeared, grew and collapsed in the long-term development 
                                                   
1  Hashino (2007b, 2010) explores Zeitlin’s first and second points.    The former study analyzes the 
relationship between small-scale firms within the district and large-scale ones located outside.    The 
latter study attempts to clarify how newly-developing weaving districts solved the problem of 






process of Kiryu weaving district in the early 20th century.    Kiryu was one of the most 
advanced silk weaving districts in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868).    It was a pioneer 
in export of silk products in the 1870s as well as the leading producer of traditional 
Japanese kimono and obi for domestic markets.    In this study, we will demonstrate that 
three different types of players attempted to lead the growth of Kiryu.    The first is 
relatively large firms established in the late 19th century which introduced the vertically 
integrated production system for mass production of export products.    The second is 
domestic market-oriented weaving manufacturers-cum-contractors [WMCs henceforth], 
who promoted division and specialization of labor with village-based out-weavers and 
other specialized small firms.    Putting-out system for weaving, dyeing, and preparatory 
and finishing processes prospered in the early 20th century.    The third is joint stock 
firms  established  in  the  early  1910s  which  adopted  power  looms  and  successfully 
sought  the  scale  economies,  thereby  “destroying”  the  out-weaving  system  and 
“constructing” factory system.    Following Parker (1984) and Mokyr (1990) who study 
the  historical  patterns  of  economic  change  in  the  Western  world,  we  would  like  to 
demonstrate that Kiryu experienced Smithian growth based on the expanded division of 
labor among a large number of firms, followed by Schumpeterian development leading 





inquire into the causes of the success and failure of the three types of weaving firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.    The next section describes an 
overview of the development of Kiryu with indicators of changes in production, labor 
force,  structure  of  firms,  and  technology.    Section  3  examines  the  characteristic  of 
firms  with  the  employment  of  more  than  10  workers  from  1895  to  1918,  whose 
production  record  was  collected  by  various  statistical  surveys.    Three  hypotheses 
regarding  the  dominant  firms  are  presented  through  the  comparison  among 
export-oriented large firms, WMCs, and newly emerged joint stock firms.    Section 4 
presents the methodology of regression analysis and examines the results.    The last 
section  concludes  by  summarizing  the  main  findings  of  the  study  and  drawing 
implications for future research. 
 
2. An Overview of the Development of the Kiryu Weaving District 
  This  section  examines  the  production  growth  in  Kiryu  since  the  late  19th 
century and investigates the changes in the extent of the inter-firm division of labor and 
the adoption of power looms which are considered as the keys to the growth of Kiryu.   
Through the observation of structural changes, we will identify the two distinct phases 





2-1 Production growth in the early 20th century in Kiryu 
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in real value of production, employment, and 
labor productivity in Kiryu, using index (1895 = 100).    In the early 1900s, the real 
value of production shows upward trend: It was 3.5 million yen in 1904 but increased to 
roughly 10 million yen in 1907.    Since then, it had been stagnant at around 10 millions 
yen until 1914.    In contrast, it experienced rapid growth around the boom period of the 
First World War  from  1914  to  1919,  which  was  17  times  increase  during  the  mere 
5-year period.    Even though it is well known that the 1920s was the era of repeated 
recessions or depressions in Japanese economy, surprisingly real value of production in 
Kiryu was maintained subsequently at the level between around 60 to 70 millions yen 
until 1929. 
  In Figure 1, solid and broken curves show the indices of the total number of 
workers and female workers, respectively.    Since the female workers account for 70 to 
80 percent of labor force, the two curves look alike.    From the late 1890s to 1900s, the 
total number of workers decreased and dropped to around 7,000 in 1904.    It continues 
to stagnate through the late 1900s but begins to increase toward the end of the 1910s.   
It was around 9,000 in 1910 and rose to 13,500 in 1920.    It suddenly dropped to less 





process.    It can be confirmed that the total labor force increased faster than female 
labor  force  in  the  1910s,  implying  that  male  employment  grew  faster  than  female 
employment.    It is also clear that the increase in production was not caused primarily 
by the increased input of workers. 
2-2 Smithian growth and Schumpeterian development 
  If  we  turn  to  the  changes  in  labor  productivity,  it  is  apparent  that  it  was 
improvement  of  labor  productivity  that  contributed  to  boosting  the  real  value  of 
production.    More importantly, it can be recognized that there are three distinct phases 
of increase in labor productivity; (1) gradual growth in the 1900s, (2) stagnation from 
the  end  of  the  1900s  to  the  mid-1910s,  and  (3)  drastically  rapid  growth  from  the 
mid-1910s to the mid-1920s.    Average annual growth rate in labor productivity was 
0.92% from 1904 to 1915 and 9.95% from 1916 to 1927. 
Figure  2  examines  the  changes  in  the  number  of  out-weavers  and  other 
production  organizations  including  factories,  cottages,  and  WMCs  in  Kiryu.
2      The 
number of out-weavers, who are primarily based in surrounding villages around Kiryu 
                                                   
2  The data in 1904 and 1905 are not available.    Statistical Survey of Gunma Prefecture where Kiryu 
was located defines four types of production organizations with two criteria, i.e. the numbers of 
workers and ownership of raw materials.    Factory is defined as a workshop with more than ten 
workers and cottage as one with less than ten workers.    On the other hand, the defining 
characteristics of the weaving manufacturer-cum-contractor is to put out raw materials to 
out-weavers.    Out-weavers are those who are engaged in weaving for contractors.    For details, see 





town, increased rapidly from the mid-1900s to the 1910s.    It was approximately 3,700 
in  1906  but  rose  to  5,800  in  1914.    Note  that  the  average  number  of  workers  per 
out-weaver workshop had been stable at about 1.5.    In contrast, the number of other 
production organizations continued to stagnate at around 500 until it shows increasing 
trend  from  the  mid-1910s.    These  observations  clearly  indicate  the  increase  in  the 
number of out-weavers per other production organization.    Indeed, it almost doubled 
from 6.8 in 1906 to 11.6 in 1914.    This indicates the expansion of division of labor, 
which was organized by WMCs.    This division of labor happened not only in weaving 
process  but  also  in  many  other  processes  carried  out  by  specialized  subcontractors 
(Hashino and Kurosawa 2011).
3     
Figure 3 illustrates the coordination activities of WMCs (left) and specialized 
processes carried out by subcontractors (right) in Kiryu around 1910.    It is apparent 
that many processes were carried out by specialized subcontractors.    It must be noted, 
however, that WMCs were originally engaged in the whole production processes but 
gradually out-sourced many processes, such as throwing, dying, designing, weaving, 
and finishing.    For example, dyeing process was one of the key preparatory processes 
                                                   
3  Specialized subcontractors are generally small and located in Kiryu town. Whether their activities 
were recorded in statistics is not known in earlier period.    Responding to a significant increase in 
the number of dyers, the prefectural government included the dyeing industry in its annual statistical 





carried by WMCs in the earlier period.    Since the introduction of synthetic dyes in the 
1880s, whose proper use required scientific knowledge, WMCs gave up dyeing and 
began to put out the process to specialized subcontractors,  who have acquired such 
knowledge.    Henceforth,  division  and  specialization  of  labor  were  gradually  and 
widely diffused.    Such an evolutionary process can be termed as Smithian growth.
4   
It is extremely important to note that despite Smithian growth from the late 
1900s to the mid-1910s indicated by the increasing number of out-weavers (Figure 2), 
neither total production nor employment increased significantly in this period (Figure 1).   
As will be discussed in the next section, we attribute this puzzling observation to the 
failure of large export-oriented firms and offsetting rise of WMCs in the early 20th 
century.    The  former  aggressively  mechanized  since  the  late  19th  century  to  create 
added value for exported products through improved designs, textures, and luster, but 
failed to expand the production (Hashino and Kurosawa 2011).     
Undoubtedly  the  most  important  single  innovation  in  Kiryu  was  the 
introduction  of  power  looms,  whose  dissemination  can  be  traced  by  the  changing 
proportion of power looms in this period.    As is shown in Figure 4, the adoption of 
                                                   
4  Interesting statistical data collected by Kiryu Trade Association for Weaving indicates how widely 
outsourcing diffused in Kiryu.    According to their report in 1900, there were 853 weaving 
producers, 37 fabric merchants, 16 scouring and finishing producers, 62 raw silk merchants, 18 dyers, 
14 dyestuff merchants, 6 cotton-yarn merchants, 12 designers for jacquard machines, 25 reed 






power looms in the Kiryu district as a whole (bold curve) started to increase from the 
mid-1910s and grew rapidly toward the 1920s.    The average adoption rate was only 
4.9% in 1915 but drastically increased to 84.1% in 1930.     
Solid  and  broken  curves  in  the  same  figure  show  the  proportion  of  power 
looms  in  Kiryu  city  (former  Kiryu  town)  and  Yamada  county  (surrounding  rural 
villages) within the Kiryu weaving district, respectively.    It is interesting to observe 
that the proportion of power looms in Kiryu city was much higher than that of Yamada 
county  already  in  1921.    Therefore,  we  can  assume  that  the  introduction  of  power 
looms in urban area proceeded at much faster rate than that in rural villages, probably 
even in the 1910s.    New technology needed new production organizations, because the 
use  of  power  looms  confers  scale  advantages.    Previous  studies  report  that  the 
introduction  of  power  loom  was  accompanied  by  the  adoption  of  factory  system  in 
Japan (Hashino 2007a; Hunter 2003; Minami and Makino 1983; Saito and Abe 1988).   
It is therefore likely that factories with power looms located in the center of the district 
played an important role in promoting Schumpeterian development since the late 1910s 
in Kiryu.    No less important might be the establishment of joint stock firms which 
contributed to financing large investments in factory buildings and machineries.
5   
                                                   
5  Although we do not analyze in this study, firms which adopted power looms made a number of 





To sum up, it seems legitimate to call the first trend of output growth Smithian 
growth and the second one Schumpeterian development.    Smithian growth is chiefly 
caused  by  the  increase  in  the  division  of  labor  which  must  have  been  created  by 
reduction in the transaction cost associated with the improved assignment of tasks and 
enforcement of property right and production responsibilities (Mokyr 1990).    On the 
other  hand,  Schumpeterian  development  is  derived  from  the  major  increase  in 
production  efficiency  by  innovations.    Such  innovations  encompass  new  production 
technology and organizational changes that enable innovative firms either production of 
a given output with much smaller amount of resources or the production of much better 
or large quantity of new products with the same resources, or both (Mokyr 1990). 
 
3. Changing Characteristics of Sample Firms and Hypotheses 
3-1 Characteristics of sample firms 
  Based on the above discussions, we attempt to investigate the behaviors of 
weaving  firms  in  Kiryu  with  the  employment  of  more  than  10  workers  covered  by 
Statistical Survey of Gunma prefectural government and Factory Survey.
6    These firms 
                                                   
6  The data source in 1915 and 1918 is Factory Survey, which was conducted by Gunma prefectural 
government in order to report to the central government.    Compared with Statistical Survey data 
used for 1906 and 1910, individual data in 1915 and 1918 contain much more detailed information 





were  termed  factories.    Although  there  are  four  production  organizations  (i.e., 
out-weavers, factories with more than 10 workers, cottages with less than 10 workers, 
and MWCs), it is possible that the increase in the number of workers converted the 
cottages and MWCs to factories.   
Table 1 exhibits the average characteristics of weaving firms in selected years 
from 1895 to 1918.    A glance establishes that the number of firms was only ten in the 
late 19th century but tripled in the 1900s.    Furthermore, the number more than doubled 
in the early 1910s and reached 88 in 1918.    Why did the number of firms with the 
employment  of  more  than  10  workers  increase  appreciably?    The  average  year  of 
establishment of firms indicates that the entry of new large firms was not necessarily the 
major  reason.    Recall  that  aside  from  out-weavers,  there  are  three  types  of  sample 
weaving  firms  in  Kiryu;  (1)  large  firms  which  attempted  ‘vertical  integration’,
7  (2) 
traditional firms including WMCs whose number of workers increased to more than 10, 
and (3) newly-established joint stock firms which equipped power looms and adopted 
factory system in the late 1910s. 
  Large firms with the employment of nearly 100 workers seem to have appeared 
                                                   
7  In our study, vertical integration refers to the production system in which preparatory, weaving and 
finishing processes are carried out within a firm. Some of them were typically out-sourced processes 
in the case of WMCs as is shown in Figure 3.    It is partly similar to that discussed by Jones (1987), 
i.e., the backward integration system in British silk industry in the 1820s and 1830s, in which 





in the late 19th century.    The average year of establishment was 1851 in 1895 and 1876 
in 1899, respectively, which are much different.    In 1895, it seems that old firms were 
dominant, even though there were a few newly-established firms which just started their 
operation.    Judging from the rising average year of establishment in 1899, it can be 
considered that newly-established firms became dominant.    The latter firms attempted 
large-scale vertical integration with extraordinarily large western machines mainly for 
preparatory and finishing processes.    These firms did not depend on the division of 
labor  with  other  small  firms,  unlike  WMCs,  which  means  that  they  did  not  enjoy 
agglomeration economies arising from inter-firm transactions.    They used hand looms 
except for Nihon Orimono Corporation, which tried to produce exportable products but 
faced difficulties in operating large-scale factory (Kameda 2011).
8 
Interestingly,  from  1899  to  1903  not  only  the  average  number  of  workers 
sharply declined from 91.5 to 33.1 but also the average year of establishment changed 
from 1876 to 1867.    On the other hand, the number of firms became tripled between 
the two years.    Thus, it is clear that major players promoting the growth drastically 
changed in this period.    In other words, while the large-scale firms failed their business, 
relatively old WMCs became dominant in the 1900s.    The average number of workers 
                                                   





continued to decline to 23.2 in 1906 (see column of 1906
b in Table 1, which excludes 
Nihon Orimono Cooperaton, as it is outlier).    Female worker ratios in 1903 and 1906 
were also lower than those in the 1890s, which strongly indicates that the relatively 
large number of male workers who were engaged in preparatory processes and delivery 
of yarns to out-weavers increased.    Loom/worker ratio was far less than unity in 1906, 
which means that not all workers in the weaving firms were engaged in the weaving 
process.    From  the  above  discussions,  it  seems  clear  that  some  WMCs  grew  to  be 
medium-scale firms and promoted the growth of Kiryu by expanding division of labor.   
It is likely that the stagnant production from the mid-1900s to the mid-1910s observed 
in Figure 1 was the result of the reduction in production by large firms and offsetting 
increase in production by growing WMCs.   
In the 1910s, new entries can be recognized from both increase in the number 
of firms and the rise of the average year of establishment.    While the average number 
of workers slightly increased compared with the 1900s, female worker ratio continued 
to decline.    WMCs would have been still dominant in this period but newly entering 
firms gradually expanded their scale of operation.    From 1915 to 1918, the average 
number of firms and the number of workers rapidly increased with concomitant rise in 





newly-established  large  firms.    At  the  same  time,  the  proportion  of  power  loom 
reached 80%.    Such newly established large firms which appeared in the 1910s can be 
considered as the new major players which promoted Schumpeterian development.    It 
is worth pointing out that with the advent of such firms, the average sale revenue per 
firm increased six times from 1915 to 1918.    Note that since the cost of putting-out 
contracts and out-sourcing are not included in the sales revenue, it becomes larger as the 
extent of the division of labor is larger.   
3-2 Comparison of Export-Oriented Firms with Other Firms 
    What  kind  of  products  did  our  sample  firms  produce?    Some  of  their 
products  were  shipped  for  domestic  markets  but  others  were  for  export  markets.   
Organized  by  WMCs,  traditional  products  for  domestic  market  were  produced  by 
utilizing  complicated  and  specialized  division  of  labor  within  the  district,  as  was 
illustrated by Figure 3.    In contrast, the large firms established in the late 19th century 
attempted to sell product at export markets without depending on any division of labor. 
  In order to compare the firms with different market orientations and locations, 
Table  2  undertakes  the  comparison  of  export-oriented  firms  with  other  domestic 
market-oriented  firms  in  Kiryu  town  and  outside  in  1906,  1910,  and  1915.
9    Data 
                                                   






source and sample size are the same as in Table 1.    The reason why we regard location 
as important is that leading WMCs tended to be located in Kiryu town partly because 
this is most convenient for them to organize putting-out contracts in various processes 
and  partly  because  access  to  railways  and  electricity  was  also  favorable  in  town.   
According to Table 2, however, other firms outside Kiryu town were likely to be WMCs, 
because, although smaller, their sales revenue was not low in 1915, if we consider the 
smaller number of employed workers.    The number of export-oriented firms increased 
from 1906 to 1910 and then declined, whereas the number of other firms in both Kiryu 
town and outside continued to increase and became dominant in 1915.    This suggests 
that the second players, large WMCs, supported Smithian growth. 
    In terms of the number of workers, export-oriented firms were largest in all 
years but their employment size declined from 71.8 workers in 1906 to 45.4 workers in 
1910.    Judging from the facts that the number of export-oriented firms doubled from 
1906 to 1910 and that average year of establishment in 1910 is 6 years younger than 
that  in  1906,  large  firms  disappeared  and  the  newly  established  firms  with  more 
moderate scale became dominant.   
Female worker ratio tends to decline over time but it is much lower in other 





other firms in Kiryu town because they are likely to be leading WMCs type firms, in 
which the relatively larger number of male workers played an important role in the 
preparatory processes, delivery of raw materials, and collection of finished products.   
Percent of firms using traditional water wheels was also high among other firms in 
Kiryu town because they were used for preparatory processes (Hashino 2007c).    Only 
some export-oriented firms introduced motive-powers in 1906 and 1910, which was 
steam engine.    In 1915, however, some of other firms in Kiryu town also equipped 
powers, even though their adoption rate was lower than that of export-oriented firms.   
This  is  likely  because  electric  powers  were  supplied  by  the  Watarase  Water  Power 
Electricity  Company,  which  was  established  in  1906  and  started  operation  in  1908 
(Kiryu  Orimonoshi  Hensankai  1940).    Prior  to  supply  of  electricity,  export-oriented 
firms had to equip motive-powers such as steam engines on their own account.    It must 
be also pointed out that the number of workers of the export-oriented firms far exceeded 
the number of looms in 1906, which indicates that many workers were engaged in a 
variety of production activities other than weaving within the large factories.   
Until the late 1900s, hand looms were used in almost all firms in Kiryu except for 
a  few  (Kiryu  Orimonoshi  Hensankai  1940).    It  is  therefore  doubtful  whether  the 





fixed inputs.    In fact, such large-scale firms disappeared and were replaced by smaller 
firms with the employment of much less than 50 workers, which were  likely to be 
successful WMC-type firms whose advantage lay in the use of the division of labor with 
out-weavers  and  other  supporting  firms.    Therefore,  we  advance  the  following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis  1:  Although  more  than  several  large  firms  with  the  employment  of 
more than 50 workers and the use of hand looms were founded in the late 19th 
century, they soon collapsed due, at least partly, to the lack of scale advantages. In 
contrast, WMCs thrived based on the out-weaving system in the beginning of 20th 
century in Kiryu. 
3-3 Comparison of Newly Emerging Large Firms with Other Firms 
  Our sample firms in 1918 benefitted from the economic boom during the First 
World War (1915-1918).    Responding to the increasing demand for the products in 
Kiryu, the number of large firms increased.    Wage rates also increased sharply in Japan, 
surpassing the Lewisian turning point according to Fei and Ranis (1963).    In fact, in 
local labor markets in the neighborhood of Kiryu, wage  rates of female workers in 
weaving, silk-reeling, and farming sharply increased in this period (Hashino 2007a).     





Establishment  of  new  factories  and  workshops  as  well  as  the  installation  of  power 
looms would have required large investment funds, which seems to have led to the 
establishment of joint stock firms, as will be shown shortly. 
  Table 3 analyzes the characteristics of 88 firms in 1918 from the perspective of 
market  orientation  and  location.    Joint  stock  firms  were  export-oriented  and 
established  around  the  war  boom  period.    They  were  particularly  large  with  the 
employment of more than 300 workers, which clearly indicates that they sought the 
scale  advantages.    There  are  many  differences  between  joint  stock  firms  and  other 
firms within the category of export-oriented firms.    Caution is needed in interpreting 
number of looms because there were both hand and power looms.    In the case of joint 
stock  firms,  female  workers  operated  primarily  power  looms,  whereas  in  other 
export-oriented firms female workers used both hand and power looms.    It must be 
emphasized that most joint stock firms were subcontractors for smaller weaving firms 
and received fees of undertaking preparatory and finishing activities from other firms 
within the districts.    Such behavior is consistent with the theory of the division of labor 
formulated by Stigler (1951), which argues that one of the main sources of the division 
of  labor  is  the  different  optimum  scales  of  production  in  different  sub-production 





established  a  few  decades  earlier.    Based  on  the  above  discussion,  therefore,  we 
postulate  the  following  hypothesis  regarding  the  large  firms  which  emerged  in  the 
mid-1910s. 
Hypothesis  2:  Several  large  joint  stock  firms  founded  in  the  mid-1910s  were 
Schumpeterian innovators, who transformed Kiryu weaving district by realizing 
the  scale  advantages  associated  with  the  introduction  of  power  looms,  factory 
production, and electricity. 
  Let  us  turn  to  the  characteristics  of  domestic  market-oriented  firms.   
Remarkable differences between 32 firms in Kiryu town and 15 others can be observed 
in female worker ratio, the number of looms, use of electricity, and holding of registered 
trademarks  in  the  1900s.    The  formers  were  likely  to  be  large  WCMs  employing 
relatively  many  male  workers  without  much  internal  production.    In  the  case  of  a 
leading WCM, called Goto Firm, about which Hashino (2007a) explores the relation 
between adoption of new production organization and technology choice, increase in 
male workers in the mid-1910s was associated with the expansion of out-weavers.    Its 
strategy was low volume production of a wide variety of products for domestic market 
by  enjoying  the  advantage  of  agglomeration  economies.
10    In  addition,  holding  of 
                                                   
10    For the flexibility of production, Nakabayashi (2007) also admits that putting-out system using 





registered trademarks in Meiji Era indicates that other firms in Kiryu town were old 
leading firms
11.    They also began the introduction of power looms, but percentage of 
power looms were the lowest among the four groups in Table 3.    For example, the 
introduction  of  power  looms  in  the  above  mentioned  Goto  Firm  was  delayed  and 
occurred  from  the  late  1910s  to  1920s.    This  accompanied  adoption  of  factory 
production system and giving up of producing a wide variety of products unsuited for 
mechanized  mass  production.    Therefore,  we  advance  the  following  hypothesis 
regarding WCMs: 
Hypothesis 3: WCMs became laggards in the era of the Schumpeterian innovation. 
 
4.    Econometric Analyses 
In order to test the validity of the hypotheses postulated in previous section, in 
this section we estimate the regression functions explaining the number of workers, 
female worker ratio, the number of looms, loom/worker ratio, proportion of power loom, 
sales revenue, and sales/worker ratio in 1906, 1910, 1915, and 1918.    Note that not all 
the data of dependent variables are available in every year except in 1918.    Sample 
firms are also different from year to  year, so that the panel data analysis cannot be 
                                                   
11  According to Arai (year unknown), around 100 trademarks were registered by firms, which are 





applied.    Thus, we estimated the regression functions separately in each year. 
4-1. Specification of Regression Functions 
Denoting the dependent variables mentioned above by Y, the estimated regression 
function is specified as follows: 
Yit = a0t  + a1t(Edo period dummy)i + a2t(Operation years in Meiji era)it + 
a3t(Export firm dummy)it + a4t(Domestic firm dummy)it + a5t(Join stock 
firm  dummy)it  +  a6t(Power  use  dummy)it+  a7t(Wheel  use  dummy)it+ 
a8t(Trademark dummy)i+ eit  , 
where subscripts i and t refer to i-th firm and t-th year, respectively; as are regression 
parameters; and e is an error term.    Edo period establishment dummy and the number 
of operation years in the Meiji era for those firms established in the Meiji period are 
used to examine if the experience of weaving business affects the scale of operation and 
productivity.    We use three mutually exclusive firm dummies, in which the base of 
comparison  is  domestic  market-oriented  firms  in  Kiryu  town  (most  likely  WMCs): 
“Export firm dummy” refers to export-oriented firms in 1906, 1910, and 1915 and to 
export-oriented firms other than joint stock firms in 1918; “Domestic firm dummy” 
means domestic market-oriented firms located outside Kiryu town;
12  and “Join stock 
                                                   
12  Since there was only one such firm in 1906, it was combined with domestic market-oriented firms 





firm  dummy”  was  used  only  for  1918  regression  because  they  were  too  few  in 
previous years.    The dummy for trademarks registered in 1897-1907 period, which was 
used  only  in  1918  regression,  is  expected  to  capture  the  behavior  of  the  leading 
WMCs.
13 
Problematic as explanatory variables are export firm, domestic firm, and joint 
stock firm dummies, and power use and water wheel use dummies, as they are likely to 
be endogenous.    Due to the paucity of exogenous variables, however, we are forced to 
use them as explanatory variables.    To the extent that they are positively correlated 
with unobservable factors included in the error term, such as managerial abilities, their 
estimated  coefficients  tend  to  be  over-estimated.    Thus,  we  can  hardly  assert  the 
causality from the estimated coefficients of these variables.    What can be conjectured 
is association or the correlation of the variables of our interest.    Another caveat is that 
while  we  apply  the  ordinary  least  squares  regression  when  depended  variables  are 
continuous,  we  apply  the  tobit  estimation  method  when  dependent  variables  are 
truncated, such as the number of looms and loom/worker ratio, which include zeros.   
Since export orientation is expected to be positively associated with the scale 
of operation, particularly in early years, the coefficient of export firm dummy (a3) is 
                                                   
13  We use ‘trademarks registered by firms in the Meiji 30s (from the late 1890s to the mid-1900s)’ 





expected  to  be  positive  and  significant  in  1906  but  becomes  insignificant  or  less 
significant in the regression equations dealing with the scale of operation in later years, 
if Hypothesis 1 is correct.    On the other hand, we expect the coefficient of joint stock 
firm dummy (a5) to be positive and significant in the employment, the number of looms, 
and  revenue  functions  in  1918,  if  Hypothesis  2  is  correct.    Finally  we  expect  the 
coefficients of all three firm dummies in the proportion of power loom function to be 
positve,  as  WMCs  were  inactive  in  the  introduction  of  power  looms  according  to 
Hypothesis 3. 
4-2. Estimation Results 
  Table  4  shows  the  estimation  results  for  1906,  1910,  and  1915.  Several 
important observations can be made.    First, neither coefficients of Edo period dummy 
nor  those  of  the  operation  years  in  the  Meiji  era  are  significant  in  any  regression 
equations.
14    These  coefficients  are  not  significant,  either,  for  1918  to  be  shown in 
Table 5.    These findings indicate that the mere production experience did not affect the 
performance of weaving firms.    Second, export firm dummy is significant in all the 
four  regression  functions  in  1906,  it  becomes  insignificant  in  the  regression  of  the 
number of workers in 1910 and 1915, and its coefficient is negative and significant in 
                                                   






the sales per worker regression in 1915.    The last result strongly suggests that sales 
revenue per worker was significantly larger for WMCs, because they use out-weavers 
and  other  sub-contractor.    On  the  other  hand,  its  impact  on  female  worker  ratio  is 
significantly positive in all three years, suggesting that female workers were employed 
to operate large lots for producing export products.    Note that the magnitude of the 
coefficients of export dummy in the regression of the number of workers are not so 
different  among  1906,  1910,  and  1915,  even  though  those  in  1910  and  1915  are 
insignificant,  which  indicates  the  larger  variations  of  employment  size  in  the 
export-oriented  firms  in  these  latter  two  years.    Thus,  it  seems  clear  that  the 
export-oriented  firms  chose  large-scale  factory  production  system  initially,  while 
employing relatively large number of female workers, but they failed to realize and 
maintain scale advantages, as is reflected in its insignificant effect on labor employment 
and sales revenue and even negative and significant effect on sales revenue per workers 
in 1915. Such results are substantially different from the case of joint stock companies 
to be examined from Table 5.    The other side of the same coin is that leading WMCs 
prospered in this period.    These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1.     
Third, power use dummy has significantly positive effects on the number of 





Note  that  the  source  of  the  power  was  steam  in  1906  and  1910,  but  it  was  almost 
completely replaced by electricity in 1915 (see Table 2).    Also note that since only 
large  export-oriented  firms  used  the  steam  power  in  1906  and  1910,  the  combined 
effects of export-orientation and the use of steam power were extremely large.    Thus, it 
appears that large export-oriented firms attempted to enjoy scale economies by adopting 
the vertically integrated production system with the installation of large steam-power 
generators.    Since  the  magnitudes  of  coefficients  of  power  use  dummy  in  the 
regression of the numbers of workers are similar among the three years, it is doubtful 
that  the  replacement  of  steam  by  electricity  brought  about  large  changes  in  the 
employment practice immediately.    Fourth, dummy for domestic market-oriented firms 
outside Kiryu town is insignificant, which indicates that the behaviors of WMCs in 
Kiryu town and outside were not substantially different in 1915.    Finally, it must be 
pointed out that three of the coefficients of water wheel use dummy are positive and 
significant in 1906, suggesting that in the absence of electricity, water wheel was used 
to expand the scale of operation and adopt the capital-intensive production method not 
for weaving but for other production processes. 
Table  5  exhibits  the  estimation  results  of  regression  functions  in  1918. 





workers,  number  of  looms,  and  sale  revenue,  as  well  as  female  worker  ratio  and 
worker-loom  ratio.    Moreover,  the  coefficients  in  the  regression  functions  for  the 
number of workers, number of looms, and sales revenue are comparatively large, which 
strongly  indicates  that  newly  established  large  joint  stock  firms  sought  the  scale 
economies.    In fact, if we compare joint stock firms and other export-oriented firms 
shown in Table 3, revenue of the former, on average, exceeded the latte by 16 times, 
whereas the number of workers is 12.5 times and the number of hand-loom equivalent 
looms  13.4  times,
15  indicating  the  strong  scale  advantages  of  the  former  over  the 
latter.
16  These results support Hypothesis 2. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the effect of joint stock firm on the power loom ratio 
is insignificant.    This is because all the joint stock firms used powers and, hence, their 
use of power looms is captured by the power use dummy. Although the difference is not 
statistically significant, it is noteworthy that coefficient of joint stock firm dummy is 
smaller that that of non-joint stock firm dummy in the loom/worker ratio regression.   
This is likely because joint stock firms served as sub-contractors for other firms by 
carrying out preparatory and finishing processes, which did not use looms.    This may 
                                                   
15  According to Hashino (2007c), price of power loom was around 300 yen, whereas that of hand 
loom was 2 yen to 5 yen.    Thus, the price ratio was 60 to 150.   
16  Note that these firms did not contract out sub-processes, so that the revenue was generated by 





result in the negative and larger coefficient of joint stock firm dummy in the sales per 
worker regression.    This negative coefficient as well as the negative and significant 
coefficient  of  non-joint  stock  export-oriented  firm  dummy  in  the  sales  per  worker 
regression  indicates  that  WMCs  in  Kiryu  town  achieved  significantly  large  sales 
revenue  per  own  worker  due  to  the  outsourcing  to  out-weavers  and  specialized 
subcontractors.   
The effects of non-joint stock firm dummy are similar to those of joint stock 
firms except for the size effects on the number of workers and looms, and sales revenue. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of its coefficients in the female worker ratio, loom/worker 
ratio, and sales per worker regressions in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 4. It 
appears  that  non-joint  stock  firms  are  not  significantly  different  from  the 
export-oriented firms analyzed in Table 4. 
The results examined so far imply that WMCs employed smaller number of 
workers, used fewer looms, particularly power looms (Table 3), and lower sales revenue 
than  joint  stock  firms  but  attained  much  higher  revenue  per  worker  due  to  the 
subcontracts with out-weavers and other specialized sub-contractors. WMCs in Kiryu 
town, however, were different from domestic market-oriented firms outside Kiryu town: 





This is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that WMCs were less active in the introduction of 
power looms, mostly likely because of their established and at least formerly successful 
subcontract-based production systems   
As may be expected, power use dummy is particularly significant in the power 
loom ratio function. As Minami (1977) emphasizes, the electrification promoted the use 
of motor-driven machines in Japan, which led to rapid decentralized industrialization in 
the early 20
th century Japan. 
Although this study does not analyze the development of this weaving district 
in  the  subsequent  periods,  it  is  known  that  WMCs  actually  followed  the  factory 
production system introduced by the joint stock firms and used power looms, which 
meant  the  demise  of  the  out-weaving  systems  in  favor  of  factory  systems  in  this 
weaving district (Hashino 2007a). 
 
5. Conclusion 
  In this study, we focused on the performances of three types of firms 
which  contributed  to  the  weaving  production  in  Kiryu  in  the  early  20th 
century.    Changing phases of production were characterized by the concepts 





sophistication  of  division  of  labor  supported  Smithian  growth,  in  which 
domestic  market-oriented  WMCs  played  a  major  role.    Introduction  of 
power looms and factory system were the major drivers of Schumpeterian 
development, which was promoted by large, export-oriented joint-stock firms.   
Three hypotheses regarding the performance of the three types of firms were 
tested by regression analyses, which reveal strategies of WMCs to utilize 
sub-contracts, the pursuit of scale economies by export-oriented firms, and 
the importance of electricity to facilitate successful adoption of power-looms 
and factory systems.    Although the rise of wage rates in the 1910s would 
have  affected  the  introduction  of  power  looms  and  relative  advantage  of 
factory systems, our study cannot identify its effect due to the cross-section 
nature of our data sets.   
We  would  like  to  conclude  this  study  by  identifying  two  major 
remaining issues for further research.    The first one is concerned with the 
importance  of  Smithian  growth.    Of  course,  division  of  labor  in  various 
industrial  clusters  were  widely  observed  in  developing  economies, 
particularly in the early stage of cluster development (Sonobe and Otsuka 





WMCs are worthy of being called entrepreneurs promoting Smithian growth 
by  organizing  specialized  production  systems.    Historically,  they  were 
engaged not only in manufacturing but also in marketing, designing, quality 
control, and making trial samples (Uchida 2002).    In other words, WMCs 
played  the  role  of  traders,  who  are  essential  for  linking  producers  with 
markets.  Although  they  were  not  so  keen  about  breakthroughs,  they 
effectively utilized existing resources in local community, e.g., cheap rural 
labor, based on mutual trust (Hayami and Godo 2005).    When the trust was 
insufficient in mobilizing collective action, support of local trade association 
or  local  government  became  crucial  for  strengthening  agglomeration 
economies  (Hashino  and  Kurosawa  2011).    It  seems  worth  exploring  the 
extent  to  which  Smithian  growth  lays  foundation  for  the  development  of 
industrial districts in its early stage of the development 
Another issue is to explore how Schumpeterian development emerges 
or  what  types  of  entrepreneurs  play  a  role  of  Schumpeterian  innovators.   
Three  types  of  innovations  were  observed  in  our  study  site;  process 
innovation  (e.g.,  introduction  of  power  looms),  product  innovation  (e.g., 





introduction  of  factory  systems).    Establishment  of  joint  stock  firms  and 
utilization of division of labor also fall under the organizational innovation.   
Since the introduction of power looms and suitable products for mechanized 
production, the adoption of factory systems, and the emergence of joint stock 
firms  are  so  closely  interrelated  with  each  other  that  they  took  place 
simultaneously.    Thus, successful innovations seem to require managerial 
capacity  to  carry  out  a  variety  of  component  innovations.    What  type  of 
human  capital  is  needed  for  such  innovations  must  be  clarified  through 
further historical research and research on the contemporary development of 
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Figure 1. Changes in real value of production, employment, and labor productivity in Kiryu, 











































production total workers female workers labor productivity
 
Source: History of Weaving Industry in Gunma Prefecture [Gunmaken Orimono Enkaku Chosasho] (1895-1901); Statistical Survey of Gunma Prefecture 
[Gunmaken Tokeisho] (after 1902). 
Note: For realized value, we used price index for textile products in Ohkawa, K. et al. Estimates of Long-term Economic Statistics on Japan since 1868 
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Source: Yearbook of Promoting Industry in Gunma Prefecture [Gunmaken Kangyo Nenpo] (1901-02); Statistical Survey of Gunma Prefecture (1906-20).     
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Note: Hashino and Kurosawa 2011.  Original figure 
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Table 1. Average Characteristics of Weaving Firms with the Employment of More Than 10 Workers in Selected Years from 1895 to 1918 
  1895  1899  1903  1906
a  1906
b  1910  1915  1918 
No. of firms 
Year of establishment
c 
No. of workers 
Female worker ratio (%)
d 
No. of looms 
Loom/worker ratio 
Sales revenue (1,000 yen) 





































































a.  Sample size of the original data is 28, including one large firm whose number of workers is 697. 
b.  Computed while excluding a large firm with 697 workers 
c.  Computed while excluding those firms whose establishment years were unknown: two firms were excluded in 1903, 1915, and 1918; three firms in 
1895; four firms in 1906; and five firms in 1910. The excluded firms are likely to be very old. 
d.  Ratio of the number of female workers to the total number of workers. 
e.  Not available.   
f.  The proportion of power loom is 78.4%. 
 
Source:    Yearbook of Promoting Industry in Gunma Prefecture (1895,1899, and 1903), Statistical Survey of Gunnma Prefecture (1906 and 1910), and 























a.  Four firms each whose establishment years were unknown were excluded. 
b.  Five firms each whose establishment years were unknown were excluded. 
c.  Two firms each whose establishment years were unknown were excluded. 
d.  Figures in 1915 show the percent of use of electricity.   
e.  Not available.                Source:    Statistical Survey of Gunnma Prefecture (1906 and 1910) and Factory Survey (1915). 
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Table 3. Comparison of Joint Stock Firms, Export-Oriented Firms, and Other Firms in Kiryu Town and Outside in 1918 
 
a.  Two firms whose establishment years were unknown were excluded. 
b.  Three firms whose establishment years were unknown were excludes. 
c.  In the case of firms which do not own any loom, we assume that percent of power looms is zero.    There are 1 such firm among             
            export-oriented non-joint stock firms, 13 among other firms in Kiryu town,    and 2 among the last category.   
 
Source:    Factory Survey (1918). 
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Table 4. Estimation Results of Regression Functions Explaining the Number of Workers, Female Worker Ratio, and Other Performance Indicators at the 
Firm Level in 1906, 1910, and 1915
a 
  1906  1910  1915 
  No.   
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Power use dummy 
 



































           


















                 





















































































































































a.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively, according to one-tailed test. 
b.  OLS regression. 
c.  Ratio of the number of female workers to the total number of workers. 
d.  Tobit regression. 
e.  Unit is 1,000 yen. 
f.  Unit is yen.         























Table 5. Estimation Results of Regression Functions Explaining the Number of Workers, Female Worker Ratio,   
and Other Performance Indicators at the Firm Level in 1918
a 
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a.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively, according to one-tailed test.   
Sample size is 88. 
b.  OLS regression. 
c.  Ratio of the number of female workers to the total number of workers. 
d.  Tobit regression. 
e.  Ratio of the number of power loom to the total number of looms including hand looms. 
f.  Unit is 1,000 yen. 
g.  Unit is yen. 
h.  Operation years of firms established after the Meiji Restoration in 1867. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 